I notice a tendency for economists that are
friendly to free markets to overstate the case for free
markets. There is a difference between saying that markets work well and saying
that markets work perfectly or even near perfectly. The first claim allows for
system wide errors in coordination while the second bears a resemblance to the
strong form of the efficient markets hypothesis and real business cycle theory.
Lawrence White and George Selgin promote free
banking in this manner. Banks under this system are said to be constrained by
competition and the threat of losses in reserves that result from an over-issue
of currency. No systemic over-issue can occur as disequilibrium is not allowed
by the model. In “How Would the Invisible Hand Handle Money?” they
write,
The standard inventory-theoretic model of reserve demand indicates, however, that a bank’s prudential or precautionary demand for reserves depends on the anticipated variance and not just the mean or expected value of the bank’s reserve losses. Although perfect in-concert expansion does not affect any bank’s mean clearing losses, it does increase the variance of each bank’s clearing losses, and does therefore increase each bank’s precautionary demand for reserves. The reserve ratio remains well anchored. [emphasis mine] (1724)
The model presented by Selgin and White is a
long run model that employs representative banks that optimizes reserve
levels according to the cost of issuing currency and the revenue earned from
the issue. This sort of analysis overlooks short-run deviations that occur in a
world of heterogeneous, competing firms and imperfect information. In their
model, competition leads banks to adjust their reserves according to the market
chosen reserve level, but this process takes time. It is unclear whether or not
information asymmetries will temporarily prevent anchoring of the reserve
ratio.
White states his thesis explicitly in terms of
the boom and bust in an article for Cato,
The boom-bust scenario could not have happened under a commodity
standard with free banking. Under that regime any incipient housing boom would
have been automatically and promptly dampened, before a severe bust became
inevitable.
White notes on the previous page that the recent
boom and bust was caused not only by monetary expansion by the Federal Reserve.
A disproportionate share of that credit flowed into housing,
channeled there by federal subsidies and mandates for widening home ownership
by relaxing mortgage creditworthiness standards. The dollar volume of real
estate lending grew by 10–15 percent per year for several years—an
unsustainable path.
Until the crisis, these mortgages were very
liquid, thanks in large part to the willingness of the government sponsored
enterprises known as Fanny Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase them. For a time,
this, in combination with high ratings that the securities received from
Moody’s and S&P, promoted and maintained elevated prices in the housing
market. But scarcity of liquidity ended the bull market in securities. The drop
in prices that followed would have brought down Fannie and Freddie for good if
not for the U.S. Treasury placing the two GSE’s into conservatorship.
But could this have occurred under a free
banking system? Again, White does not think so.
… a commodity standard with free banking minimizes monetary
shocks. Its strong self-regulating properties stop the banking system from
overfinancing an investment surge, the way the Fed did for the housing market,
to the point where it becomes an unsustainable boom full of the malinvestments
that make a severe bust unavoidable.
This assumes that the Federal Reserve was the
prime driver of over investment. It is likely that overinvestment in the
housing sector would have occurred even under a free banking system, though in this case it is still due to an intervention. The
incentives provided by the GSEs were powerful enough on their own to funnel
investment into the housing sector even under a system of free banking. The
Federal Reserve probably augmented the bubble, but I am not convinced that the
existence of the Federal Reserve was a necessary condition for a “severe bust”
nor am I convinced that the market rate of interest does not overshoot the
natural rate as banks expand credit during booms and contract credit during
busts. Banks must take risks in order to compete. Those banks that invest in
too many failing projects will themselves fail. Ex ante it is
unclear which banks these will be just as it is unclear what is the market
level of reserves or what is the natural rate of interest. Only ex post can
we conjecture what value or range of values may have fulfilled these standards.
Expect development of these thoughts coming
weeks and the some consideration of the possibility bubbles driven by credit expansion in a free market.
I'm not so sure the GSEs were a cause. What made agency securities attractive were the low capital requirements on those agency MBS'. But, capital requirements were low, because MBS' in general were considered relatively safe. These assets became much less safe when the housing market collapsed, but prior to 2006-07, few people thought a market-wide collapse in housing prices could happen (regional collapses were hedged in these MBS'). What explains the price trend (what drove investment into MBS')? Either (a) money was taken out of other sectors to invest into housing, or (b) looser constraints on credit caused something akin to an Austrian business cycle.
ReplyDeleteThe influence of the GSEs required the help of high ratings from S&P and Moody's. Early on, MBSs were attractive to foreign investors, especially in the wake of the crisis in Asia. The Fed exercised some influence, but its actions were not out of the normal except for a short deviation after 9/11. (see the chart from my last post). The rate of expansion even slowed after 2001. A lot of "dumb money" came into the market later on because these investments were so attractive (again due to high ratings).
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